In this paper we extend earlier work on deontic deadlines in CTL to the framework of alternating time temporal logic (ATL). The resulting setting enables us to model several concepts discussed in the deontic logic literature. Among the issues discussed are: conditionality, ought implies can, deliberateness, settledness, achievement obligations versus maintenance obligations and deontic detachment. We motivate our framework by arguing for the importance of temporal order obligations, from the standpoint of agent theory as studied in computer science. In particular we will argue that in general achievement obligations cannot do without a deadline condition saying the achievement has to take place before it. Then we define our logic as a reduction to ATL. We demonstrate the applicability of the logic by discussing a possible solution to Chisholm's paradox. The solution differs considerably from other known temporal approaches to the paradox.
Introduction
In agent theory, as studied in computer science, we are interested in designing logical models that describe how agents can reason about and decide what to do, given their obligations, permissions, abilities, desires, intentions, beliefs, etc. Decisions have a temporal aspect, namely, they are about what to do in the future, and they deal with conditional information, namely, they have to result from considering and reasoning about hypothetical circumstances. The deontic ATL operators we consider in this paper are both conditional and temporal. Their syntactical form is O A (ρ ≤ δ : ξ A ). The intuitive interpretation of the operator is that if the agents in the set A achieve δ, they are obliged to achieve ρ at the same time or before that, under penalty of suffering the negative condition ξ A . A good example of such an obligation is the following: according to Dutch traffic regulations one has to indicate direction before one turns off. In this example, δ is 'turning off', ρ is 'indicating direction' and ξ can be the circumstance of being vulnerable for being fined by a police officer. Obligations O A (ρ ≤ δ : ξ A ) are thus conditional on the actual occurrence of δ and are temporal in the sense that the achievement ρ has to precede the condition δ. Readers familiar with the deontic logic literature will recognize that another example is the second sentence of Chisholm's original paradoxical scenario: 'if one helps, first one has to tell'. In section 9 we discuss formalizations of Chisholm's scenario in our formalism.
One might wonder why we think obligations expressed as O A (ρ ≤ δ : ξ A ) are so important. Let us explain. Obligations that guide agents in the actions they select for performing are always about the future. Obligations about the past are not interesting for agents having to decide what to do, because we may safely assume that agents do not control the past. We adopt terminology from BDI-theory, and say that the reference time of the obligations we are interested in is the future, while the validity time is the present 1 . The latter emphasizes that we want our logic to model the reasoning of an agent that has to decide what to do 'now', considering the obligations he has about the future. A rough classification of obligations whose reference time is the future is the division in achievement obligations and maintenance obligations. Similar terminology is used by Cohen and Levesque [8] who distinguish between achievement goals and maintenance goals. In an achievement obligation, the objective is to achieve something in the future that is not already (necessarily) true now. For a 'maintenance obligation' the objective is to preserve the truth of a condition that is already true now. Our main interest in this paper will be with achievement obligations, since as we will see in section 6, maintenance obligations can be rewritten into equivalent achievement obligations. So, for agent theory as studied in computer science achievement obligations are the most interesting type of norms. Now we will argue in section 2 that achievement obligations are close to meaningless without a condition δ before whose occurrence the achievement ρ has to be realized, which explains why obligations of the form O A (ρ ≤ δ : ξ A ) are central to our investigations.
In some of the previous work on this subject [4], we referred to the condition δ as a 'deadline' of an obligation O A (ρ ≤ δ : ξ A ). That was partly because there we studied this type of modality in the purely temporal framework of CTL. Here we use ATL for the temporal component. ATL has elements of logics of Agency. In [5] we showed how to embed Coalition Logic (CL), which is a subset of ATL, in the STIT framework of Horty [11] 2 . Since ATL can be seen as a logic of (strategic) ability it enables us to define different notions of control over conditions. And adding information about control over the condition δ (or, to be more precise, absence of control over ¬δ, which is something else) is actually what can turn a conditional temporal order obligation into a real deadline obligation, as we explain in section 8. So obligations O A (ρ ≤ δ : ξ A ) as such should not be referred to as 'deadline' obligations. They are conditional temporal order obligations, which can be made into deadline obligations, by adding that agents A do not control avoidance of the deadline condition δ.
Why Achievement Obligations Need a 'Deadline' Condition
Dignum et al [9, 17] stress the importance of providing deadlines (which they do not view as particular kinds of conditionals, like we do) for obligations from practical considerations. And indeed, in the environments where software agents are envisioned
